HUMAN SUBSTITUTION BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: BREACH OF CONTRACT AND CIVIL LIABILITY IN OBLIGATIONS TO DO

Abstract

This article analyzes the legal impacts arising from the non-transparent use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools in the performance of personal obligations to do. The research problem is to determine whether the delivery of a service substantially produced by AI, when the contract presupposes the personal intellectual performance of the hired professional, may constitute breach of contract. The study adopts qualitative, bibliographic and documentary research, using the deductive method and examining legislation, civil law doctrine and recent studies on artificial intelligence, authorship and civil liability. The hypothesis advanced is that the substantial and undisclosed replacement of human performance, in non-fungible obligations, may violate objective good faith and frustrate the legitimate expectation of personal authorship held by the contracting party. It is concluded that, depending on the circumstances of the case, this practice may justify contractual termination, damages and possible moral compensation, without excluding the legitimate use of AI as a merely auxiliary tool, provided that transparency is compatible with the nature of the obligation.